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ABSTRACT 
In today’s information age, Information Warfare has 
gained prominence as an effective means of waging war.  From 
a service perspective, the Naval Network Warfare Command and 
specifically the Navy Information Warfare Community has been 
tasked to lead in providing manning, training, and equipment 
to make this form of warfare a reality.  While this 
relatively new requirement brings tremendous opportunity to 
the community, it has also presented many challenges.  
Specifically, effective Information Operations integration 
and a well-defined career path that provides officers with 
experience, education, and skill sets in both Signals 
Intelligence and Information Operations have evaded the 
community.   
This thesis proposes systems engineering, combined with 
technical expertise, as the solution to confront the 
Information Operations integration problem and provide an 
avenue to bridge the gap between the current expertise in 
Signals Intelligence and Information Operations.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assist the Navy 
Information Warfare Community in their transition from 
singular expertise in Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) to the 
much wider information domain.  This thesis examines the 
fundamental concepts of Navy Information Warfare, the role 
of systems engineering in Information Warfare (IW), and how 
to ensure the Navy Information Warfare Community is capable 
of fulfilling and excelling in current and future 
requirements.  The focus of this examination is the 
assessment of the systems engineering process and how it can 
be applied to current Information Operations (IO) 
integration and workforce development.  The results of this 
research will provide the Navy Information Warfare Community 
with an alternate approach to integrating Information 
Operations and a clear direction in workforce development 
further advancing the Navy Information Warfare Community in 
its transition to information warfighters. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
established IO as a primary warfare area on equal footing 
with areas such as surface warfare or air warfare.  In 
addition, in 2005 the CNO directed the development of an IO 
career force capable of meeting new and expanded Navy and 
joint missions.  The Navy Cryptologic Community was 
designated as the lead in making this career force vision a 
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reality.  As a result, on May 23, 2005, officer designators 
were renamed from “Cryptology” to “Information Warfare” to 
acknowledge the expanded scope of responsibility.1 
The Community has a long and distinguished history of 
SIGINT expertise dating back to the early twentieth century.  
Its support to the National Security Agency (NSA) since 1952 
has helped provide actionable intelligence to military 
leaders and policy makers in defending the nation and 
advancing United States global interests.  Nevertheless, 
with a new role of IW, the community must build upon its 
strong foundation in SIGINT and develop a skill set capable 
of delivering a tactical, operational, and strategic 
advantage in the information environment.  
C. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
The benefit of this study will be the production of a 
competent understanding of Navy IW concepts and the role 
systems engineering plays in the Navy IW Community.  Current 
and future applications will be addressed with specific 
recommendations that will assist the IW community in 
developing a more knowledgeable and skilled workforce poised 
to meet existing and future challenges. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research was conducted with the intent of 
addressing the following research questions: 
                     
1 Cryptologic Officer Name Change to Information Warfare (Newport, 
RI: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2005), 
http://www.npc.navy.mil/NR/rdonlyres/94757598-596D-4D2C-A5D6-
C25BE9865A54/0/NAV05233.txt (accessed July 25, 2008). 
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1. Primary Research Question 
• How can the Navy Information Warfare Community 
progress in their transition from Signals 
Intelligence experts to the expanded role of 
information warfighters? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the fundamental concepts associated with 
Navy Information Warfare? 
• What is the systems engineering role in Navy 
Information Warfare and how can it be applied to 
confront the current Information Operations 
integration challenge? 
• How can systems engineering assist the Information 
Warfare Community in bridging the gap between 
Signals Intelligence specialization and a 
comprehensive understanding of Information 
Operations? 
• What modifications to career path progression for 
Information Warfare Officers ensure a workforce 
capable of fulfilling current and future 
requirements and addressing Information Operations 
challenges? 
E. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the Navy 
Information Warfare Community with an increased emphasis on 
officer workforce development.  The documents investigated 
will consist of joint and Navy specific publications to 
assist in establishing fundamental concepts.  Applicable 
systems engineering literature will be examined to develop 
associated principles.  Finally, formal naval message 
traffic and documents available to the community through 
Navy Knowledge Online (NKO) will be explored and analyzed. 
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The research methodology for this thesis includes: 
• Literature review of applicable government 
documents, books, articles, and other sources. 
• Advice and perspective from leaders in the Navy 
Information Warfare community. 
• Recommendations for improvement based on research, 
experience, and analysis. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis will follow the chapter 
outline below: 
Chapter II focuses on developing an understanding of 
the fundamentals of Navy Information Warfare to include 
Signals Intelligence and Information Operations core 
capabilities.   
Chapter III discusses the systems engineering process 
and what role it plays in Navy Information Warfare.  Future 
application to Information Operations will also be 
investigated. 
Chapter IV critically analyzes the current officer 
career path and proposes a new approach in attempting to 
respond to the challenges faced today. 
Chapter V concludes this thesis and offers further 
recommendations aimed at improving the Navy Information 






II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF NAVY INFORMATION 
WARFARE 
A. BACKGROUND 
In September 2007, Rear Admiral (RADM) Edward Deets, 
the Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) Vice Commander and 
leader of the Navy Information Warfare Community, 
articulated a new strategic plan to ensure that the new 
naval warfare area of IO was being developed and integrated 
to offer maximum capability to military commanders.  The 
community vision was stated as follows: 
The Navy’s Information Warfare (IW) Community 
delivers overwhelming information superiority to 
naval and joint commanders.  We do this by 
leading the integration and application of the 
core capabilities of Information Operations and 
Signals Intelligence to shape, influence, and 
defeat select audiences in support of commanders’ 
objectives.  Our community applies signals and 
information expertise, and attacks, defends and 
exploits networks to pursue and capitalize on 
opponent vulnerabilities in the information 
environment.2 
Prior to RADM Deets’ guidance, many wondered where the 
Navy IW Community was headed.  Would it completely abandon 
its SIGINT roots in favor of the new warfare area of IO?  
This document clearly delineated that SIGINT, in conjunction 
with IO, would comprise the Information Warfare domain with 
Naval Network Warfare Command being the executive agent.  
                     
2 Edward H. Deets III, Information Warfare Officer Letter and 
Community Guidance (Naval Network Warfare Command, 2007), 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1568700010 
(accessed July 25, 2008). 
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B. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE  
SIGINT is the first major concept of IW and is defined 
as a category of intelligence that includes communications 
intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign 
instrumentation signals intelligence regardless of 
transmission medium.3  SIGINT collection is limited to 
foreign governments, organizations, persons, and 
international terrorists.  SIGINT collection is driven by 
intelligence customer requirements and the mission has 
transformed through the years from a relatively fixed 
environment to a very dynamic high speed mass communication 
environment.  With this increase in volume, speed, and 
transmission mediums available, the challenges of providing 
timely actionable SIGINT have only amplified.   
1. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) 
COMINT is defined as technical information and 
intelligence derived from foreign communications by other 
than intended recipients.4  Collection can take place on 
wire, radio, or other electronic means to include automated 
information systems and computer networks.  The National 
Security Agency/Central Security Service is ultimately 
responsible for all processing of COMINT. 
                     
3 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint 
Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008), 500. 
4 Ibid., 108. 
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2. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 
ELINT is defined as technical and geolocation 
intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications 
electromagnetic radiations not including nuclear or 
radioactive sources.5  Operational ELINT (OPELINT) and 
technical ELINT (TECHELINT) are the two subcategories of 
electronic intelligence.  OPELINT consists of actionable 
intelligence information such as the location, movement, and 
activity of emitters and associated weapons.  TECHELINT 
focuses on the technical aspects of emitters such as signal 
characteristics, functions, and vulnerabilities of 
associated emitters.  ELINT processing is conducted by 
national ELINT agencies along with regional Combatant 
Command Joint Intelligence Centers.   
3. Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence 
(FISINT) 
FISINT is defined as technical information and 
intelligence derived from foreign electromagnetic emissions 
associated with the testing and operation of future 
systems.6  The most common signals associated with FISINT 
are telemetry and video data links.  FISINT processing is 
conducted by specialized national-level Service and 
Department of Defense (DoD) organizations. 
C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) 
While each of the services has tailored the concept of 
IO to fit their needs, the Navy fully endorses the joint 
                     
5 Joint Publication 1-02, 179. 
6 Ibid., 214. 
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definition of Information Operations with an emphasis on the 
maritime environment.  Information Operations is defined as: 
The integrated employment of the core 
capabilities of electronic warfare, computer 
network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception, and operations security, in 
concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp adversarial human and automated decision 
making while protecting our own.7 
Joint doctrine identifies the supporting capabilities 
as Information Assurance, Physical Security, Physical 
Attack, Counter-intelligence, and Combat Camera.  In 
addition, the related capabilities consist of Public 
Affairs, Civil-Military Operations, and Defense Support to 
Public Diplomacy.   
1. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
EW refers to any action involving the use of 
electromagnetic (EM) or directed energy (DE) to control the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).8  EW includes three major 
subdivisions: 
• Electronic Attack (EA) 
• Electronic Protect (EP) 
• Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
While EW has been around for many years, it continues 
to grow in importance because of the increasing reliance on 
the EMS to serve as a medium for information sharing.  The 
                     
7 Joint Publication 1-02, 261. 
8 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Electronic Warfare. Joint Publication 3-13.1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007), I-2. 
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advantages of controlling the EMS not only allow the US to 
shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial data, but also allow 
unimpeded access to the EMS for friendly use.  The Navy enjoys 
a wealth of experience in EW and has been sought out by the 
Army for its expertise as evidenced by the Army’s decision to 
send soldiers to NAS Whidbey Island, a center for Navy EW 
training with the intent of using the Navy’s model to develop 
Army Electronic Warfare Officers.9  An overview of EW is 
provided in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   Overview of EW [from Joint Publication 3-13.1, 
Electronic Warfare, 2007]10 
                     
9 Joseph R. Pitts, "Making Up for Lost Time: The Army is Stepping Up 
to Fill a Critical Gap in EW Training," Electronic Warfare Working 
Group, 
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiatives/ew/Library/Briefs/brief22.htm 
(accessed August 25, 2008). 
10 Joint Publication 3-13.1, I-3. 
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a. Electronic Attack (EA) 
EA is the subdivision of EW involving the use of EM 
energy, Directed Energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack 
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of 
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat 
capability.11  EA is considered a form of fires and examples 
include EM jamming/deception, expendables such as flares or 
decoys, and counter radio controlled improvised explosive 
devices (Counter-RCIED). 
b. Electronic Protect (EP) 
EP is the subdivision of EW involving actions taken 
to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any 
effects of friendly or enemy use of the EMS that degrade, 
neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.12  Examples 
include spectrum management/deconfliction, emission control 
(EMCON), and use of wartime reserve modes (WARM). 
c. Electronic Warfare Support (ES) 
ES is the subdivision of EW involving actions that 
search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize 
sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy.13  
The purpose of these actions is to provide information that 
could lead to threat recognition, targeting, or the planning 
and conduct of future operations.  Examples include threat 
warning, direction finding, and collection supporting EW. 
                     
11 Joint Publication 3-13.1, I-(2-4). 
12 Ibid., I-4. 
13 Ibid. 
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2. Computer Network Operations (CNO) 
CNO is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, 
exploit, and defend electronic information and 
infrastructure.14  The main subdivisions of CNO are: 
• Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
• Computer Network Defense (CND) 
• Computer Network Exploit (CNE) 
While the availability and capability of computers 
continue to increase, the same can be said for their 
vulnerabilities and opportunities.  Military and civilian 
organizations are becoming more and more dependent upon 
networked computers and infrastructure in order to meet 
demands for faster information sharing.  As a result, CNO 
continues to gain prominence as an effective IW application.  
CNO supports and enables the other core capabilities, but the 
relationship with EW is growing more intertwined with the 
expansion of wireless networking and increasing use of the 
EMS.   
a. Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
CNA consists of actions taken to disrupt, deny, 
degrade, or destroy information in computers or their 
networks.15  Conducting these actions usually require high-
level authority and legal considerations.  Examples include 
transmitting viruses that compromise or destroy data, Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks, data modification, and malicious 
code injection. 
                     
14 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Information Operations. Joint Publication 3-13 (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006), II-(4-5). 
15 Joint Publication 3-13, II-5. 
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b. Computer Network Defense (CND) 
CND involves actions taken to protect, monitor, 
analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within 
DoD computer networks and infrastructure.16  Examples 
include blocking access to websites with known security 
risks, monitoring email traffic for sensitive information, 
malicious code and program detection, and intrusion 
detection-tools. 
c. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
CNE consists of actions taken to enable 
intelligence collection through the use of computers and its 
networks to gather data from target or adversary automated 
information systems and infrastructure.17  Examples include 
system probing, data acquisition and infiltration, and 
remote digital surveillance. 
3. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected 
truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 
organizations, groups, and individuals.18 
While PSYOP has played a major role in military 
operations for centuries, the value of effective PSYOP has 
                     
16 Joint Publication 3-13, II-5. 
17 Ibid. 
18 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Psychological Operations. Joint Publication 3-53 (Washington, D.C.: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003), I-1. 
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been magnified in the current information environment.  Mass 
communication capabilities, including 24-hour news channels 
and the internet, have created an environment that allows 
people to access information almost instantaneously.  The 
internet, in particular, has permitted people to tailor 
their information needs through searches and requests.  As a 
result, perceptions and opinions are being formed at a much 
more rapid pace and therefore emphasizing the importance and 
need of well-planned and timely PSYOP.  The Army maintains 
nearly all the expertise, experience, and training in the 
PSYOP field.  Examples include leaflets, print media, 
Commando Solo radio broadcast, television production, and 
internet presence.19 
4. Military Deception (MILDEC) 
MILDEC is defined as actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military 
capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing 
the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that 
will contribute to the accomplishment of the mission.20 
MILDEC, is without a doubt, the most underutilized core 
capability of IO.  MILDEC has a rich history of success, but 
its deceptive nature presents many challenges.  First, the 
American public often perceives MILDEC as immoral and 
untruthful, making this tactic undesirable.  In addition, 
many in the military are reluctant to use this tactic 
because they erroneously view MILDEC as a tool of the 
                     
19 Joint Publication 3-53, III-5. 
20 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Military Deception. Joint Publication 3-13.4 (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006), I-1. 
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weak.21  Effective deception requires a high degree of 
understanding of adversary capabilities and decision making 
processes.  Adversary courses of action (COA) often become 
the objectives of MILDEC operations.  Coordination among all 
friendly forces, along with good operational security, is 
imperative to conducting successful MILDEC.  MILDEC employs 
four different deception techniques that include feints, 
demonstrations, ruses, and displays.22  Examples include 
deceptive lighting on ships, demonstrations of amphibious 
landings, and broadcasting cryptic messages to imply 
impending operations. 
5. Operations Security (OPSEC) 
OPSEC is defined as the process that identifies 
critical information to determine if friendly actions can be 
observed by adversary intelligence collection systems, if 
widely available information could be gathered and 
interpreted to uncover friendly intentions, and then execute 
measures that eliminate or reduce adversary exploitation 
capability of friendly critical information.23 
Of the five core capabilities of IO, OPSEC is the most 
difficult to embrace because of its defensive nature.  
Consequently, many do not take OPSEC seriously often 
resulting in the preventable revelation of friendly 
capabilities and operations to adversaries.  Often times, 
                     
21 Walter Jajko, "Deception: Appeal for Acceptance; Discourse on 
Doctrine; Preface to Planning," Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (Oct-Dec, 
2002), 352.  
22 Joint Publication 3-13.4, I-7. 
23 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Operations Security. Joint Publication 3-13.3 (Washington, D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2006), vii. 
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even unclassified information, when correlated with other 
bits of unclassified information, can provide enough detail 
to reveal sensitive operations.  The importance of correctly 
identifying critical friendly information and protecting 
that information cannot be overstated.  Examples include:  
randomizing transportation routes, managing radar emissions, 
encrypting communications, concealing budgetary 
transactions, and concealing issuance of orders. 
D. SUPPLEMENTARY IW CONCEPTS 
While SIGINT and IO comprise the foundation of Navy IW, 
additional concepts such as information superiority, 
environmental awareness and shaping, and effects-based 
operations must be understood to fully employ these tools 
effectively. 
1. Information Superiority 
Information Superiority is defined as the advantage 
created through exploitation by collecting, processing, and 
disseminating information while denying the adversary the 
ability to do the same.24  Information superiority enables 
commanders to understand the situation, evaluate the desired 
effects, and select the appropriate decision to achieve 
those effects.   
2. Environment Awareness and Shaping (EAS) 
EAS consists of processing information and 
comprehending the operational environment to ensure friendly 
                     
24 Joint Publication 3-13, I-5. 
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forces minimize risk and maintain information superiority.25  
EAS also contributes to the Navy’s concept of Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) through its analysis of adversary IO 
capabilities and vulnerabilities.  This ability to compare 
friendly and adversary IO capabilities and vulnerabilities 
allow commanders to maximize advantages in planning day-to-
day operations. 
3. Effects-Based Operations (EBO) 
EBO consist of actions taken to identify and engage 
targets’ capabilities and vulnerabilities in the most 
efficient manner to achieve a desired effect that supports 
the commander’s objective.26  EBO requires a thorough 
knowledge of adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities 
along with an understanding of all instruments capable of 









                     
25 Theater and Campaign Information Operations Planning. NTTP 3-13.1 
(Newport, RI: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2008) (accessed 
July 27, 2008) 2-9. 
26 NTTP 3-13.1, 3-(2-3). 
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III. ROLE OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IN NAVY IW 
A. BACKGROUND 
Systems engineering has long been applied to the DoD 
acquisition process.  The purpose was to translate a stated 
need into an operational capability through an integration 
process that balances needs, constraints, technology 
limitations, budgetary considerations, and schedule.  
Systems engineering has since evolved into an application 
that is involved in nearly all forms of warfare.  While 
several definitions currently exist, the DoD’s most current 
definition of systems engineering is: 
…approach to translate approved operational needs 
and requirements into operationally suitable 
blocks of systems.  The approach shall consist of 
a top-down, iterative process of requirements 
analysis, functional analysis and allocation, 
design synthesis and verification, and systems 
analysis and control.  Systems engineering shall 
permeate design, manufacturing, test and 
evaluation, and support of the product.  Systems 
engineering principles shall influence the 
balance between performance, risk, cost, and 
schedule.27 
Simply put, systems engineering uses an 
interdisciplinary approach of people, elements, and 
processes to deliver products that meet customer needs. 
                     
27 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics, The New DoD Regulation 5000.2-R (Washington, 
D.C.: 2001), 76. 
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B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
Although implementation varies across all fields, the 
principles associated with systems engineering generally 
remain the same.  A hybrid model of the systems engineering 
process, using Blanchard and Fabrycky’s Systems Engineering 
and Analysis, International Council on Systems Engineering’s 
Systems Engineering Handbook, and Defense Acquisition 
University’s (DAU) System Engineering Fundamentals, will be 
developed to provide a genuine understanding of the process.  
System inputs, requirements analysis, functional 
analysis/allocation, system design synthesis, systems 
analysis and evaluation, verification/validation, and output 
will be discussed in detail.  It is important to note that 
this is an iterative process and must be constantly 
evaluated and improved upon for this to be an ultimate 
problem solving application.  An overview of DAU’s systems 





Figure 2.   Systems Engineering Process [from DAU System 
Engineering Fundamentals, 2001]28 
1. Input 
Customer requirements drive the systems engineering 
process.  The customer initiates the first step by detailing 
needs, objectives, constraints, metrics related to 
performance, and a statement of the problem.29  Greater 
emphasis may be placed on certain factors which will and 
should influence the overall design.  The efficiency of this 
                     
28 Defense Acquisition University and Bob Lightsey, Systems 
Engineering Fundamentals (Ft Belvoir, VA: 2001), 35. 
29 Benjamin S. Blanchard and W. J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and 
Analysis, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J: Pearson Prentice Hall, 
2006), 55. 
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entire process can be directly related to the amount of 
detail provided by the customers in these early stages.   
2. Requirements Analysis 
Requirements analysis is the first step of the systems 
engineering process.  It begins by identifying the problem 
and establishing a definition that describes what the new 
system will do and how it will perform.30  Defining the 
problem is the most important and most difficult part of the 
process because the result will drive the design.  As a 
result, it is important to spend the appropriate amount of 
time to get this definition right.  Involving the customer 
in this process is critical to ensuring both parties are 
aligned with the task ahead.  Collaboration will result in a 
solid foundation with which to build, and save a significant 
amount of time in the long run.  Requirements analysis must 
also address functional requirements and constraints.  
Functional requirements deal with quality, timeliness, 
quantity, and availability while constraints detail 
limitations such as environment, standards, threats, and 
laws. 
3. Functional Analysis and Allocation 
The purpose of a functional analysis is to translate 
the output of the requirements analysis into a functional 
description of the product.  This description identifies 
what services the product will provide and how well it must 
perform them.  Many times this process includes using a 
hierarchical structure, or system architecture, to break the 
                     
30 Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 36-37. 
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system down into subsystems to better understand what the 
system has to do.  Within this architecture, performance 
requirements are allocated to each functional level with the 
intent of providing a baseline for future design and 
support.31  Functional flow block diagrams (FFBD) are often 
used to facilitate and enable this process to take place.  
FFBD decompose functions into sub-functions and sequences 
that indicate relationships and allow vertical traceability 
through all levels of the system.  In Figure 3, F1 is 
decomposed into a further sub-function F1.1.  F1.1 is then 
broken down into F1.2 or F1.3.  Decomposition continues 
until all related sub-functions have been appropriate 
sequenced.   
  
Figure 3.   Functional Flow Block Diagram Example 
[from INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, 2004]32 
                     
31 Systems Engineering and Analysis, 78-80. 
32 Jim Whalen, Richard Wray and Dorothy McKinney, Systems Engineering 
Handbook: A "what to" Guide for all SE Practitioners, Version 2a, June 
2004 ed. (International Council on Systems Engineering, 2004), 242. 
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4. System Design Synthesis 
System design synthesis is a creative process where 
systems engineers use the baseline model created in the 
functional analysis and allocation stage to develop a 
physical architecture capable of fulfilling stated 
requirements and performance objectives.33  In this stage, a 
design team integrates functions, components, people, 
procedures and hardware/software to create multiple 
candidate architectures that set the stage for trade-off 
studies.   With each candidate, a narrative or diagram 
should be created to describe its features, parameters, 
interaction with other system elements, and methods for 
evaluation.  This approach allows trade-off studies to be 
performed in the most objective, impartial manner. 
5. Systems Analysis and Evaluation 
Once the design synthesis is complete, each candidate 
is technically analyzed to evaluate, document, and 
ultimately select the best solution to the problem.34  
Maintenance, compatibility, logistics, compliance, training, 
life cycle costs, and environmental factors all factor into 
this process.  Trade-off studies are then conducted to 
compare and evaluate alternative approaches to the problem.  
In this stage, selection criteria, preferably quantitative, 
must be determined to assist with the decision making 
process.  Metrics must also be established to standardize 
the selection process with appropriate weights assigned to 
the most important characteristics.  Next, all adverse 
                     
33 Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 57. 
34 Ibid., 32. 
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consequences must be considered with each alternative 
solution.35  The figure below provides an overview of the 
trade-off process. 
 
Figure 4.   Trade-off Study Process  
[from DAU System Engineering Fundamentals, 2001]36  
6. Verification/Validation 
Once the trade-off study has produced the best product 
available, verification/validation must be accomplished to 
                     
35 Systems Engineering Handbook : A "what to" Guide for all SE 
Practitioners, 176. 
36 Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 113. 
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ensure that the product satisfies the requirements and needs 
of the customer.37  Verification determines if system 
specifications, functional requirements, and performance are 
compliant with pre-established requirements.  Validation, 
usually conducted by an independent third party, is often 
performed in a simulated or actual operational environment 
to demonstrate that the product, as configured, accomplishes 
the desired objective. 
7. Output 
Output is the final product of the systems engineering 
process.  Here, physical architecture, product 
specifications, performance parameters, system design 
definitions, baselines, maintenance support, and other 
appropriate technical details are documented for the 
customer.38  Most of this information should be available 
and compiled from other stages in the product development.  
The intent of this documentation is to provide design 
details and support to the customer and also establish a 
baseline for future development. 
C. CURRENT APPLICATIONS 
System engineering methodologies play a critical role 
in protecting our information and exploiting that of our 
adversaries.  Defending our information requires a great 
deal of systems integration and understanding the threat 
that the adversary poses.  On the offensive side, a systems 
                     
37 Systems Engineering Handbook : A "what to" Guide for all SE 
Practitioners, 183. 
38 Systems Engineering Fundamentals, 80. 
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engineering approach assists in deploying sensors 
effectively, analyzing information from several different 
sensors, and integrating systems to display information 
coherently. 
1. Protecting Information 
The current information infrastructure of the DoD is 
extremely complex and involves numerous interacting 
components.  The military’s reliance on digital and 
electronic information capabilities to process, store, and 
transfer data is essential for planning and executing 
operations.  As a result, adversaries seek to exploit 
vulnerabilities in these systems to gain a competitive 
advantage.  Systems engineering assists in employing a 
“defense-in-depth” approach to combat the wide range of 
threats posed to our systems.  This approach integrates 
people, operations, and technology to establish multiple 
levels of protection to ensure survivability and mission 
accomplishment.39  Examples include requiring a need-to-
know, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), password 
requirements, information system monitoring, 
classifications, and certification and accreditation.  
Systems engineering utilizes all of these separate 
disciplines and integrates them into a single methodology 
designed to protect our information from adversaries.  This 
is done through a rigorous analysis of capabilities and 
vulnerabilities.  The results of this analysis provide 
decision makers with the appropriate knowledge they need to 
                     
39 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Doctrine Division, 
Information Operations. Joint Publication 3-13 
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mitigate adversary threats with a balanced and integrated 
defense consisting of people, technology, and operations. 
2. Exploiting Information 
Our ability to exploit the adversary’s information is 
just as important in our quest for information superiority.  
Systems engineering also plays a critical role in this 
process.  Our adversaries possess a variety of capabilities, 
employ a wide range of tactics, and operate all over the 
world.  Consequently, information warfare systems and 
sensors must employ an integrated approach to search for, 
process, analyze, disseminate, and display this information 
in one “common operational picture.”  Electronic Warfare 
provides an excellent example to demonstrate this method.  
In this instance, suppose an adversary develops a new 
missile that our current EW systems cannot detect or provide 
any countermeasure to oppose the threat.  Systems engineers 
conduct a threat analysis of the missile, identify the 
desired effects of the new EW system, perform a 
vulnerability analysis, design a system capable of 
countering the threat, and test the system in an operational 
environment to ensure it has accomplished its stated 
requirement.  This process is also used for integrating 
various sensors for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance in order to effectively process, analyze, and 
disseminate information accordingly. 
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D. FUTURE APPLICATION 
1. Background on IO Integration Challenge 
Information Operations has gained prominence as an 
effective warfighting application.  In today’s information 
age, its significance only continues to grow.  Therefore, 
the US military’s ability to employ IO effectively is of 
utmost importance.  However, only fully integrated IO can 
truly maximize its capability and this has been a challenge 
for IO officers and staffs.  Although most commanders can 
recite the definition of IO or at least describe the core 
capabilities, some commanders have developed different 
methods for integrating IO while others have provided little 
guidance.  Recently, the Joint Operation Planning Process 
(JOPP) has been used to integrate IO into an overall 
operation.  Yet, this assumes that the core, supporting, and 
related capabilities have already been integrated themselves 
prior to this point.  However, no standardized process for 
integrating the core, supporting, and related capabilities 
exists which is absolutely necessary to achieve the greatest 
effect.   
The other difficulty associated with IO integration is 
that the core capabilities of IO are a combination of 
technical and non-technical disciplines.  While many people 
possess expertise in one or two core capabilities, very few 
understand them all.  The technical aspects of EW seem 
distant to the softer side of PSYOP.  The Naval Postgraduate 
School 595 Information Warfare Systems Engineering 
curriculum incorporates both of these disciplines into a 
systems engineering paradigm.  Students in this curriculum 
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graduate with a unique skill set.  First, they have the 
technical expertise to confront the technical challenges 
associated with IO.  Second, their exposure to the influence 
side of IO provides them with the knowledge to establish a 
good IO foundation.  Finally, the systems engineering 
methodology serves as the medium that integrates these very 
distinct capabilities into a comprehensive IO plan and 
maximizes the effects.  This skill set provides the basis 
for solving this IO integration challenge. 
2. IO Integration Conceptual Model 
The systems engineering principles and process 
developed earlier in the chapter will provide the foundation 
for a new conceptual IO integration model.  IO integration 
is the responsibility of IO planners and staffs.  The IO 
cell chief need not know how to employ each capability, but 
must understand each of the capabilities and know the 
limitations in order to integrate them efficiently.   
This process begins with a recognized authority 
(customer) expressing a need to begin contingency or 
deliberate planning through communication vehicles such as 
Warning Orders (WARNO) and Commanders Guidance.  Needs, 
objectives, constraints, restraints, and a statement of the 
mission are levied by the authority to supporting entities.  
IO planners then use this input to guide the systems 
engineering process.   
Similar to requirements analysis, IO planners should 
first identify the problem and then provide a definition of 
the desired effect that IO will accomplish.  In this phase, 
constraints such as the operating environment, terrain, 
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Rules of Engagement, and target profile are just some of the 
aspects that must be analyzed prior to designing a plan.  
Higher guidance may also specify functional requirements 
that must be accomplished as well.  Once these aspects have 
been addressed, IO planners must engage the higher authority 
with its analysis to ensure that IO planning is correctly 
translating earlier input into clearly defined goals.   
The next step of this model consists of utilizing the 
analysis from above and expressing IO capabilities in terms 
of functions.  Here, IO capabilities will be broken down 
into what each capability will accomplish and how well it 
will perform.  Once again, functional flow block diagrams 
can be used to allocate capabilities for each required 
function.  This allows planners to see and understand the 
full capability of IO and provide additional options for 
final design.    
In the synthesis stage, IO planners use the functional 
analysis and allocation provided above to develop a physical 
architecture of resources and capabilities needed to fulfill 
stated requirements.  IO planners incorporate people, 
equipment, and procedures to develop multiple courses of 
action.  These courses of action each require detailed 
descriptions to include people, equipment, and associated 
measures of effectiveness in order to provide an objective 
standard of comparison. 
Next, each IO COA must be analyzed in order to evaluate 
and ultimately select the best capable of achieving the 
desired effect in the most efficient manner.  Timing, 
availability of resources, logistics, environmental 
conditions, and people all factor heavily into this process.  
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It is important in this step to standardize the selection 
process by establishing criteria that reflects the 
commander’s priorities so appropriate weight and influence 
can be afforded.  Another important task, often overlooked, 
that must be accomplished in this stage is identifying the 
possible unintended consequences of each candidate.  
Analysis from this task can often provide details that have 
yet to be considered and make the commander’s decision much 
easier.   
Once the best COA has been decided upon, verification 
and validation must be performed to ensure the COA satisfies 
the original requirements and needs of the higher authority.  
The COA must comply with established requirements, 
constraints, and restraints while achieving the desired 
effect.  If possible, testing the COA through modeling and 
simulation or in a similar operational environment provides 
further validation to the selected COA. 
The final output of this process is a fully integrated 
IO plan capable of achieving the desired effect.  This 
output must include documentation created throughout the 
process to provide commanders and planners with design 
details.  This provides a baseline and methodology for 
commanders to comprehend and also allows other IO planners 
insight into solutions that may be applicable to them.  A 
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IV. DEVELOPING FUTURE INFORMATION WARRIORS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Navy Information Warfare Community has accepted the 
challenge to develop a workforce that can provide SIGINT and 
IO expertise to fleet and joint commands.  With this 
acknowledgement, through official messages and community 
documents, Navy IW leadership has provided general guidance 
and tasking to the community in order to expedite the 
transition from a SIGINT-only focus to information warriors.  
Significant changes must be made to the current 
organization, training pipeline, manning, and investment in 
resources to make this goal a reality.  This chapter will 
focus specifically on workforce development and apply the 
systems engineering model created in Chapter III to 
critically analyze the current career path and focus for the 
IW community.  The chapter will conclude by offering 
recommendations and proposing a new approach that ensures a 
ready, experienced, and skilled workforce capable of 
fulfilling requirements and leading the information war. 
B. STATED COMMUNITY DESIRES 
Navy Information Warfare leadership has communicated 
its desires and vision for the future through correspondence 
such as Naval Network Warfare Command (NNWC) Strategic Plan 
2006-2010, Information Warfare Community Strategic Plan, 
Community Management Update:  Milestone Billets, Screening 
Process and Career Path, and other forms of communication 
such as community-oriented PowerPoints.  Although the 
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content of each of these vary, they all share a common 
understanding of the importance of force development. 
1. Naval Network Warfare Command Strategic Plan 
2006-2010…A Framework for Decision Making  
The NNWC Strategic Plan provides the NNWC communities, 
which includes Information Professional (IP), IW, Space 
Cadre, and IO career force, with strategies, goals, and 
measureable effects.  The purpose of this plan is to ensure 
leaders have the information and tools to make quick and 
well-informed decisions while degrading or influencing 
adversary decision-making capabilities.40  In general, the 
strategic plan outlines six main goals with multiple sub-
goals that will ultimately define success or failure for 
NNWC.  Specifically, Goal 4 expresses a desire to develop a 
workforce capable of achieving information superiority.41  
Each of the NNWC communities plays a significant role in 
contributing to information superiority.  IPs are usually 
responsible for information assurance and the defensive side 
of information superiority while the IWs and Space Cadre 
usually focus on the offensive nature of information 
superiority.  This thesis concentrates specifically on the 
IW Community.  An overview of Goal 4 is provided below. 
                     
40 Naval Network Warfare Command Strategic Plan 2006-2010...a 
Framework for Decision-Making, Version 2.1 ed. (Naval Network Warfare 
Command, 2007), 5, 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/exittracking?path=http://www.netwarcom.
navy.mil/NETWARCOM%20Strategic%20Plan_Executive%20Version%202-
0_1%2011.pdf (accessed August 23, 2008). 
41 Ibid., 15. 
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Figure 6.   Goal 4 of NNWC Strategic Plan  
[from NNWC Strategic Plan 2006-2010, 2007]42  
2. Information Warfare Community Strategic Plan  
The IW Community Strategic Plan, released in September 
2007, conveys broad objectives and specific tasks to the 
community with the intent of rapidly developing IO as a 
primary warfare area with maximum capabilities and charting 
a course for the future for the Navy IW Community.  The 
three broad objectives consist of community alignment to 
warfighting-requirements, force development, and innovation 
                     
42 Naval Network Warfare Command Strategic Plan 2006-2010...a Framework 
for Decision-Making, 15. 
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of systems and concepts.43  With reference to force 
development, two of the key tasks are provided below: 
• Develop and approve and Officer Training continuum 
model for the accession, professional military 
education, and continuing education for IW 
officers.44 
• Identify both gaps and options to balance 
technical and non-technical graduate level 
education.  Ensure the IW community is positioned 
to provide leadership across the spectrum of IO 
pillars.  Leverage continuing education 
opportunities for technical, language, culture, 
and operational planning skills.45 
3. Community Management Update:  Milestone Billets, 
Screening Process and Career Path 
The Community Management Update:  Milestone Billets, 
Screening Process and Career Path message addresses the 
growing demand for IO leadership in maritime and joint 
environments.46  It also recognizes that IW officer career 
planning must adapt to ensure the workforce is capable of 
meeting current and future requirements.  The message 
                     
43 Information Warfare Community Strategic Plan, (Naval Network 
Warfare Command, 2007), 2, 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1319600036 
(accessed August 23, 2008). 
44 Ibid., 9. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Community Management Update: Milestone Billets, Screening Process 
and Career Path, (Naval Network Warfare Command, 2007), 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1219700004 
(accessed August 25, 2008). 
 37
identifies the “Milestone Billets” and announces the 
implementation of a milestone screening board that will 
convene to screen Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders for 
assignment to sea duty and other key IW billets on 
operational and afloat staffs.  In addition, it advocates 
the need for a clearly defined career path that is capable 
of adapting the changing requirements in the information 
environment. 
4. Additional Community Desires 
Two briefs, the Information Warfare Officer Detailer 
Brief and the Officer Community Management Roadshow Brief 
that are available at Navy Knowledge Online, describe career 
planning implications, community values, and other aspects 
of community information.  Specifically, community 
statistics with regards to joint education, individual 
augmentation, billet structure, and postgraduate education 
are all addressed with an eye on the future.47  Other 
community initiatives, force shaping, and billet progression 
are also addressed.48  These two briefs provide an excellent 
representation of the current state of the community and 
each concludes with guidelines for future success. 
                     
47 Dom Lovello, Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & 
Community Manager Brief, (Naval Network Warfare Command, 2007),  
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1273100033 
(accessed August 25, 2008). 
48 Sean Heritage, Cooperative Community Management, (Naval Network 
Warfare Command, 2008), 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1581300026 
(accessed August 25, 2008). 
 38
C. CURRENT EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES  
Advanced education degrees continue to be highly valued 
in the IW community.  With just over 1,000 officers and 
nearly 1,200 billets, the community must learn to do more 
with less.  Currently, 18-23 quotas are available annually 
for IWOs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).49  Officers 
usually attend NPS as O-3s in their second or third tour.    
Programs and minimum quotas available annually are as 
follows: 
• Electrical Engineering (5) 
• Computer Science (5) 
• Information Warfare (5) 
• Regional Studies (3) 
In addition, quotas for Space Systems Engineering are 
available in FYO8.  Other limited graduate education 
opportunities are available through Service colleges or 
civilian institutions funded by the Navy.  Although advanced 
education degrees have not become formally required for 
continued promotion, selection screening boards have 
emphasized the importance of obtaining graduate degrees to 
further solidify their package and enhance professional 
development.50 
D. CURRENT CAREER PROGRESSION 
Officer accession into the Information Warfare 
Community comes from a variety of sources including Officer 
                     
49 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 10 (accessed August 25, 2008).  
50 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 12 (accessed August 25, 2008). 
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Candidate School (OCS), United States Naval Academy (USNA), 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Lateral 
Transfer/Redesignation, and recall.  Each year roughly 50 
new officers, with the majority entering by way of Lateral 
Transfer/Redesignation, join the IW Community.51  New 
accessions usually possess strong technical backgrounds such 
as degrees in science, engineering, computer science, or 
systems management.  Degrees in foreign policy, area 
studies, or language proficiency also meet minimum academic 
requirements for the community.  In addition, new accessions 
must undergo a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) 
to determine if they are capable of maintaining eligibility 
for access to sensitive and highly classified information.   
Once these requirements are met, new accessions (1640 
Navy designator) begin their initial training in Pensacola, 
FL at the Center for Information Dominance (CID).  The 
Information Warfare Basic Course (IWBC) is a five week 
course introducing the various aspects of IW.52  They 
include: 
• Introduction to Security 
• Electromagnetic Theory 
• Satellite Fundamentals 
• Signals Collection Operations 
• Collection Management 
                     
51 "LDO CWO & New Accessions Corner," Naval Personnel Command Bureau 
of Naval Personnel, 
http://www.npc.navy.mil/Officer/Intelligence_Information/InfoWar/LDO+CWO
+and+New+Accessions+Corner.htm (accessed August 26, 2008, 2008). 
52 Information Warfare Basic Course, (Commander Naval Network Warfare 
Command, 2008), 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1290600011 
(accessed August 27, 2008). 
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• SIGINT Reporting 
• Computer Networks 
• US Cryptologic System 
• RADAR 
• Military Communications 
• Tactical Cryptology 
• Traffic Analysis 
• Information Operations 
Afloat and ashore cryptologic operations are the main focus 
of this initial training.  Upon graduation, officers will be 
assigned to either the NSA or one of its field sites, Navy 
Information Operations Commands (NIOC), to gain basic 
leadership experience while learning the fundamentals of 
collection, analysis and reporting, communications, and 
information security.53  Information Warfare Officers (IWO) 
will also be given an Information Warfare Personnel 
Qualification Standard (PQS) that must be completed within 
18 months of initial assignment.  Upon completion of the PQS 
and a successful oral board chaired by NIOC Commanding 
Officers, IWOs will be deemed “fully qualified” as a 1610 
Navy designator.   During this initial assignment, IWOs will 
be afforded the opportunity to provide tactical cryptologic 
support to operational commanders from either ashore or 
deployed on surface combatants, aircraft, or submarines.   
 After the conclusion of the first tour, IWOs have a 
variety of billets they may pursue.  While sustained 
superior performance is the main ingredient for promotion, 
sea duty in key afloat, Naval Special Warfare, Individual 
                     
53 Information Warfare Basic Course. 
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Augmentation, or Direct Support billets provide IWOs with 
critical experience and allows them to be very competitive 
in future selection screening boards.  117 PCS afloat 
billets are available ranging from numbered fleet, carrier 
strike group (CSG), expeditionary strike group (ESG), and 
amphibious squadron (PHIBRON) staffs to division officers 
aboard CV/CVN, LHD/LHA, DDG, and CG platforms.54  Individual 
Augmentation (IA) opportunities also exist to serve not only 
in a tactical billet and gain valuable expereince, but also 
in a joint environment.  Shore assignments are also 
available through Direct Support, NIOC Staffs, or NPS.  
However, the longer one waits to fill sea duty billets, 
seniority and rank factors become more prevalent and 
severely limit the billets available.   
 The following tour will be completely dependent upon 
the previous tour.  If an officer served in a Permanent 
Change of Station (PCS) afloat billet the previous tour, 
then the officer will most likely be detailed to shore 
assignments such as NPS, NIOCs, NIOC Staffs, or the NSA.  In 
contrast, if an officer has yet to serve on sea duty, then 
this is the best opportunity to fill that gap in their 
professional development.  An absence of sea duty at seven-
to-nine year point of one’s career could have negative 
consequences at the officer’s first selection screening 
board for O-4.  In summary, fleet operational tours, 
worldwide NSA tours, warfare qualifications, and advanced 
education degrees are extremely valuable experiences for 
                     
54 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 5-6. 
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professional development and selection screening boards.55  
An overview of career progression from O-1 to O-3 is 
provided below. 
 
Figure 7.   Overview of O-1 to O-3 Career Progression  
[from Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, 
Placement & Community Brief, 2007]56 
NIOC, Direct Support (DIRSUP), Air Crew, and PCS Aloat 
billets listed above mostly entail providing tactical SIGINT 
support to deployed forces.  Although some IW Officers are 
afforded the opportunity to serve as Electronic Warfare 
Officers in PCS Afloat billets, this lack of exposure to IO 
early in career progression directly contributes to the lack 
of experience and expertise in IO that the Navy IW Community 
                     
55 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 12. 
56 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 13. 
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desires.  Yet, the figure describes a Milestone Track-Upper 
Tier that provides officers with the most dynamic career 
path currently available and provides them with both 
tactical and shore experience.  This Milestone Track-Upper 
Tier career path, along with sustained superior performance, 
will certainly enhance one’s promotion chances.  In 
contrast, an Alternative Track-Lower Tier consists of the 
standard initial NSA field-site tour followed by additional 
shore assignments.  While promotion can still be achieved, 
it becomes much more difficult and risky. 
 Similarly, career progression for O-4 contains two very 
different paths.  Tours that fulfill milestone billets are 
the most coveted and entail a screening process.  These 
milestone billets include both shore and sea duty.  
Currently, 57 (23%) billets are identified as milestone 
billets for O-4.57  This percentage highlights the 
competitiveness for these billets and the importance of the 
screening board.  Some of the key milestone billets for O-4 
include sea billets such as Cryptologic Resource Coordinator 
(CRC), Deputy Information Warfare Commander (DIWC), Numbered 
Fleet Cryptologist (NFC) or shore billets such as Executive 
Officer (XO), Joint billets, or Naval Personnel Command 
(NPC) Detailer.58  Successfully serving in any of these 
milestone billets greatly enhances one’s chances for 
promotion to O-5.  IA billets have yet to be classified as 
either milestone or non-milestone billets.  However, there 
is no question that many, if not most, O-4/O-5 IA billets 
                     
57 Community Management Update: Milestone Billets, Screening Process 
and Career Path. 
58 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 14. 
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are heavily focused on IO in the joint environment.  
Experience in these billets provides, without a doubt, the 
most comprehensive IO experience available.  O-4s may also 
choose an alternative route that consists of non-milestone 
billets such as staff duty at Fleet Forces Command (FFC), 
NNWC, Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), or other shore 
billets as department heads and NSA field sites.59   
 O-5 career progression, much like O-4, comprises two 
diverse paths that an officer may take.  47 (37%) billets 
are identified as key milestone billets for O-5.60  While 
still very competitive, this increased percentage can be 
attributed to the shortage of senior officers in the IW 
Community.  O-5 milestone billets include sea billets such 
as NFC, DIWC or shore billets such as Commanding Officer 
(CO), XO, Fleet Information Operations Center (FIOC) Chief, 
NPC Detailer, and Naval War College.61  An alternative track 
consisting of major staff duty or department heads at 
various NSA field sites comprise other non-milestone billets 
available in the community.  An overview of career 
progression for O-4/O-5, once again noting the heavy SIGINT 
focus, is provided in Figure 8. 
                     
59 Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & Community 
Manager Brief, slide 14. 
60 Community Management Update: Milestone Billets, Screening Process 
and Career Path. 
61 Lovello, Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & 
Community Manager Brief, slide 14. 
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Figure 8.   Overview of O-4 and O-5 Career Progression  
[from Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, 
Placement & Community Brief, 2007]62 
Only 47 O-6 billets are available for Information 
Warfare Community.  Of those, 19 (40%) are considered 
milestone billets.63  These milestone billets include CO, 
NSA/Central Security Service Hawaii Commander, and other 
lead cryptologic/IO positions at Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) 
Command, Pacific Command (PACOM), OPNAV, Fleet Forces 
Command, NSA, Naval Personnel Command, and NNWC.  With only 
three active duty flag billets available to the IWO 
community, successful completion of one of these billets is 
                     
62 Lovello, Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & 
Community Manager Brief, slide 14. 
63 Community Management Update: Milestone Billets, Screening Process 
and Career Path. 
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essential in remaining competitive for flag promotion.  An 
overview of O-6 career progression is provided below. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Overview of O-6 Career Progression  
[from Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, 
Placement & Community Brief, 2007]64 
E. GAP ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
After examining the stated community desires, current 
educational opportunities, and current career progression, 
two areas are currently deficient and fail to prepare the IW 
Community for the challenges of tomorrow.  1) Initial 
Information Warfare Officer training at the Center for 
Information Dominance and 2) the lack of a clearly defined 
career path at all levels hinder the IW Community from 
completing the transition from SIGINT to information 
warfare.  As a result, IWOs are entering their first IW tour 
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with a lack of IO knowledge and continue down a very generic 
career path that fails to develop the IO expertise needed in 
the community.  
These two areas should be addressed if the IW Community 
truly desires to own the information domain.  A greater 
emphasis on IO during the initial training for IWOs at CID 
is essential to establishing IO on par with SIGINT.  At this 
stage, most officers know very little about the community 
and it is at this point that they develop a foundation and 
first impression of the community direction.  Consequently, 
the current career path must be modified and clearly 
articulated to reflect the growing demand for IO expertise.  
If achieved, the IW Community would be much better prepared 
to fulfill the expanding requirements with officers that 
have the skill sets, experience, and education to succeed. 
1. Initial IW Training 
As stated earlier, the current 5-week IWBC offers an 
introduction to the IW Community.  Based on the list of 
topics covered and the stated intent to “provide the 
fundamental skills necessary to conduct cryptologic 
operations both ashore and afloat,” IWBC clearly sets the 
wrong tone for new accessions by failing to address the 
emerging importance of IO.65  Although the course does 
address the technical foundation required by the community, 
a failure to capitalize on this critical opportunity to 
shape the new minds and future leadership of the IW 
                     
64  Lovello, Information Warfare (IW) Senior Detailer, Placement & 
Community Manager Brief, slide 15. 
65 Information Warfare Basic Course. 
 48
Community only prolongs the transition from a SIGINT-only 
focus to information superiority.  Consequently, officers 
walk away from their initial IWO training with the 
perception that SIGINT is the only or main focus of the 
community.  This perception is reinforced during an IWO’s 
first tour at a NSA field site.  A concerted effort must be 
made to expose new accessions to IO early and often in their 
careers.  Simple modifications to the curriculum both in 
coverage and length would provide a significant return on 
investment.  On a positive note, the newly released IWO 
Personnel Qualification Standard, completed during an IWO’s 
first tour, will assist and reinforce this effort by 
requiring a baseline knowledge level that combines both 
SIGINT and IO fundamentals.66  
Latitude is given to the various naval communities on 
how they choose to train and educate their workforce.  Of 
course, manning and budgeting does play a key role in the 
length and depth of training.  However, a five-week course 
introducing IW, given the information driven environment 
that exists, does not suffice in providing a comprehensive 
introduction to IW.  The Intelligence Community currently 
sends its officers to a 20-week introductory course prior to 
their first tour.67  There is no reason, especially in age 
dominated by information, that the initial IW accession 
training is relegated to five weeks with little IO focus.  
                     
66 Personnel Qualification Standard for Information Warfare Officer, 
(Naval Education and Training Command, 2008), 
https://www.fleetforces.navy.mil/netwarcom/N1/N1%20Shared%20Documents/TY
COM%20Approved%20-%20NAVEDTRA%2043357-2.pdf (accessed September 2, 
2008). 
67 "Personnel Qualification Program FAQs," Navy Knowledge Online, 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=15901000112008) 
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The IW Community should extend IWBC to at least 10 weeks to 
cover both IO and SIGINT.  In addition, equal focus between 
IO and SIGINT is necessary to ensure new accessions 
understand the new direction of the community and the 
increased importance on IO for all phases of military 
operations.  The first five weeks should cover previously 
existing topics under SIGINT.  The second five weeks should 
focus on the following core set of Educational Skill 
Requirements (ESR): 
• Information Operations:  The officer will have an 
in-depth understanding of IO and its supporting 
and related capabilities. 
• Command Structure and Organizational Processes:  
The officer will understand the command 
relationships, processes, and products related to 
IO. 
• Intelligence Support to IO:  The officer will 
understand the role intelligence plays in 
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing IO. 
• Information Operations Planning:  The officer will 
be introduced to the IO planning process and its 
integration into the overall planning process. 
This initial introduction of IO in the early stages of 
training will provide huge dividends in future tours.   
2. IWO Career Path 
The IW Community has taken recent steps forward in 
clarifying career progression by identifying career 
milestone billets and restructuring the Naval Officer Billet 
Classifications (NOBC) to reflect the current mission.  
These billets are centrally managed and filled by Naval 
Personnel Command.  The NOBCs are: 
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• 9805, TIWO-SURF, Tactical Information Warfare 
Officer (Surface) 
• 9810, TIWO-SUBSURF, Tactical Information Warfare 
Officer (Subsurface) 
• 9815, TIWO-AIR, Tactical Information Warfare 
Officer (Air) 
• 9820, TIWO-SPECWAR, Tactical Information Warfare 
Officer (Special Warfare) 
• 9825, IWO NAT, Information Warfare Officer 
(National) 
• 9830, IWO COORD, Information Warfare Officer 
(Coordinator) 
• 9835, IWO PLN, Information Warfare Officer 
(Planner) 
• 9840, IWO STAFF, Information Warfare Officer 
(Staff)68 
Of note, IAs are not accounted for in these listed NOBCs.  A 
separate NOBC for IAs should be designated as TIWO and 
fulfill tactical requirements on par with Surface, 
Subsurface, Air, and Special Warfare billets.  
Milestone billets and NOBCs give officers targets and 
goals to pursue.  Yet, a clearly defined career path still 
evades the community.  The status quo allows officers to 
fill billets without the experience, education, or skill 
sets needed to succeed.  This not only hurts the officers 
themselves, but also customers whom the community supports.  
Adopting a career path requiring specific experience, 
education, or skill sets for certain billets greatly 
                     
68 Navy Officer Billet Classifications (NOBCs) for the Information 
Warfare Community, (Naval Network Warfare Command, 2008), 
https://wwwa.nko.navy.mil/portal/download?lib_documentId=1531900002 
(accessed September 2, 2008). 
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enhances officers’ chances to succeed while improving the  
credibility of the community.  
While a career path model can never account for all 
officers in the community, a standard model, based on O-1 
new accessions, is a good starting point.  The requirement 
for IWBC, with proposed recommendations, followed by the 
first tour at an NSA field site would remain the same.  
Following the first tour, officers would have three options 
for a second tour:  NPS, Tactical, or Shore.  Each of these 
would require fully qualified (1610 Navy designator) IW 
officers but no specific experience.  After completing a 
second tour, an IWO will be limited to the two remaining 
options, based on their previous tour.  Advanced education 
degrees and tactical assignments are the two most valued 
achievements at this point in a career.        
An overview of the initial flow progression for O-1 to 
O-3 (Stage 1) is shown below with text to the right of each 
option indicating related billets available. 
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Figure 10.   Career Flow Chart – Stage 1 
The community is currently reviewing the return on 
investment from NPS degrees.  There is no doubt that 
Regional Studies, Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, 
Space Systems Engineering, and Information Warfare degrees 
all make valuable contributions to the IW Community.  
Nevertheless, prioritization of these degrees is necessary 
in order to successfully fulfill existing and future 
requirements.  As noted earlier, the emergence of IO, 
integrated with all forms of warfare, would lead one to 
believe that the Information Warfare Systems Engineering 
degree would prove most applicable and provide the greatest 
return on investment for the community.  Moreover, according 
to Lt Col Terry Smith, the Information Warfare program 
officer at NPS, a recent curriculum review of Information 
Warfare Systems Engineering identified areas for 
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improvement, including a greater emphasis on all aspects of 
IO.  Implementing the recommendations from this review will 
further reinforce the applicability to IO and provide a 
greater depth of knowledge in each of the core capabilities.  
Computer science and, particularly, electrical engineering 
are technically intensive degrees with narrow focus.  A 
comprehensive systems engineering degree over a broad, 
diverse set of disciplines that prepares officers for all 
facets of IW is best suited for success.  Thus, an increase 
in quotas for the 595 Information Warfare Systems 
Engineering program is necessary to develop the workforce 
the community desires.   
After completing a third tour, IWO career options 
become completely dependent upon previous billets, 
experience, and education.  O-4/O-5 progression, once again, 
consists of three different options:  Shore, Sea Milestones, 
and Shore Milestones.  Shore billets consist of NIOC billets 
and shore staff billets.  NOBC 9825 (IWO NAT), accomplished 
in the first tour, would be the only requirement to fill 
these billets.  Conversely, Sea Milestone A billets would 
require previous experience in NOBC 9825 and one of the TIWO 
NOBCs (9805/9810/9815/9820).  This TIWO requirement would 
ensure the O-4/O-5s have the prior tactical experience from 
which to build upon.  In addition, an advanced education 
degree would be a prerequisite for all Sea and Shore 
Milestone billets.  Specifically, Sea Milestone B billets, 
9830 (IWO COORD) and 9835 (IWO PLN), would require 
Information Warfare Systems Engineering Degrees.  These 
billets require IWOs to organize, plan, and integrate IO and 
SIGINT into fleet and joint operations which parallel the 
education and skill sets developed by this curriculum.  
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Shore Milestone billets should also be fulfilled by IWOs who 
have experience in NOBC 9825 and one of the TIWO NOBCs 
(9805/9810/9815/9820).  This puts a premium on tactical 
experience and ensures that leadership ashore better 
understands how to support fleet and joint operations.  An 
overview of flow progression for O-4/O-5 (Stage 2) is 
provided in Figure 11 with text to left of each option 
indicating required experience/education and text to the 
right of each option indicating billets possible. 
 
Figure 11.   Career Flow Chart – Stage 2 
Career progression at the O-6 level becomes much more 
simplified due to the limited number of billets.  All 47 O-6 
billets are shore billets with 19 currently considered 
milestone billets.  All non-milestone billets would only 
require previous experience in NOBC 9825 and NOBC 9840 (IWO 
Staff).  In addition, advanced education degrees would be 
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mandatory for promotion to O-6.  Additionally, O-6 Shore 
Milestone A billets would require completion of a Shore 
Milestone billet and either Sea Milestone A or B billet in 
Stage 2.  Furthermore, because of the IO focus, Shore 
Milestone B billets should require previous experience in a 
Shore Milestone billet and Sea Milestone B billet in Stage 
2.  An overview of flow progression for O-6 (Stage 3) is 
provided in Figure 12 with text to left of each option 
indicating required experience/education and text to the 
right of each option indicating billets available. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Career Flow Chart – Stage 3 
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V. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In today’s environment, the need for information is 
greater than any time in our history.  The DoD has 
recognized this and tasked its services to provide manning, 
training, and equipment to control the information domain.  
Specifically, the Navy has tasked the Information Warfare 
Community with this mission.  The community has responded by 
standing up new commands and providing direction to lay out 
a new way forward.  Historical traditions have provided 
stumbling blocks to the community.  SIGINT, which has been 
the foundation of the community for years, must now share 
the focus with IO.  IO experience and expertise takes time 
to develop, but the growing demand for information 
superiority continues to grow. 
The intent of this thesis was to identify aspects of 
Naval IW that can be improved and enable a workforce more 
capable of accomplishing information superiority.  Using a 
systems engineering approach to IO integration is one 
solution.  The ability to integrate multiple disciplines 
into a single functioning system is an invaluable skill 
that, if applied correctly, can act as a force multiplier.  
Secondly, the IW Community has actively campaigned for a 
clearly defined career path.  After conducting a gap 
analysis, a new career progression approach was presented.  
At each stage of progression, billet availability was 
dependent upon previous experience, skill sets, and advanced 
education.  The advantages of implementation are obvious.  
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First, IWOs would know exactly what experience, skill sets, 
and knowledge they would need to attain in order to pursue 
future billets.  Secondly, IWOs filling those billets would 
be much better prepared to succeed.  Finally, the customers, 
whom the IWO Community supports, would be the beneficiary 
leading to more informed decision making. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The scope of this thesis was limited to the Naval 
Information Warfare Community and, specifically, the IO 
integration process and current officer career path.  A new 
career progression path was presented after critically 
analyzing publically available literature.  However, 
community manning documents and in-depth statistics would 
provide a much deeper look into the feasibility of such a 
plan.  Also, detailed information regarding the Information 
Warfare Basic Course curriculum would allow extensive 
analysis and review to be done with the intent of improving 
layout of the course.       
Some other related questions that need to be addressed 
are: 
• What direction should enlisted education and 
training take in order to develop an enlisted 
workforce ready to meet the information challenges 
of the future? 
• How can the IW community organize to address both 
the technical and soft aspects of IW without 
losing technical proficiency?  Is it possible? 
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• What balance should exist between SIGINT and IO 
with respect to the future development of the 
workforce? 
• How can the IW Community better leverage inter-
service assets to mitigate a gap in the IWO 
community?  
• How can the IW Community develop the necessary 
skill sets to succeed for late accession/lateral 
transfer officers?  How does their career path 
change?     
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